In Ex parte Walker, No. 1110436,
Harris sued Walker, a Macon County Deputy Sheriff, following a motor-vehicle
accident. In his complaint, Harris factually alleged that, at the time of
the accident, Walker “was engaged in the regular course and scope of his
employment for the Macon County Sheriff’s Department.” Because Harris was
bound by this factual allegation in his complaint, the Supreme Court held that
Walker enjoyed Sec. 14 immunity.
The Supreme Court rejected Harris’s
attempted reliance on Ex parte Haralson, 853 So. 2d 928 (Ala. 2003),
where the court concluded that a deputy sheriff would not enjoy Sec. 14
immunity if, at the time of the accident, he was not acting within the line and
scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff.
Harris’s problem was that he had
specifically alleged that Walker was acting within the line and scope of his
employment as a deputy sheriff.
The Haralson opinion would be
helpful if, at the time of the accident, while operating a “sheriff” vehicle,
the deputy had deviated from his work to perform a personal errand or was not
working or engaged in some policing activity. If you are confronted with
that scenario, the key would be to not factually allege that the defendant “was
engaged in the regular course and scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff.”
