Forum Non Conveniens Ruling in Alabama

The result in Ex parte Southeast Ala. Timber Harvesting, LLC, No. 1110349 (Ala. Apr. 20, 2012), is not surprising given prior opinions.  Webster, likely a Lee County resident, was injured in Lee County when timber came off a truck owned by Southeast.  Because Southeast’s principal place of business was in Chambers County, Webster filed her complaint in Chambers County.

The Supreme Court held that the Chambers County court erred in not granting Southeast’s Sec. 6-3-21.1-based motion to transfer.  The “interest of justice” prong dictated a transfer.  This result solidifies the “Alabama” rule that, when there is an accident, such as a highway accident, a defendant is entitled to have the matter tried in the county where the accident occurred.  It does not matter that the plaintiff chose to sue the defendants in their “home” county. 

Alabama Supreme Court Opinion on Rule 56(c)(2) and the 10 Day Rule

In Tucker v. Scrushy, the plaintiffs filed a garnishment against Richard M. Scrushy Charitable Foundation. Among other things, the plaintiffs alleged that the Foundation was Scrushy’s alter ego. The Foundation filed an answer and the plaintiffs contested the answer. 

In a separate action, the plaintiffs sued the Foundation, asserting claims under the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“AUFTA”); no “alter ego” claim was made.  The Foundation moved for a partial summary judgment, asserting that the AUFTA claims were not timely brought.  Following being allowed to conduct additional discovery, the plaintiffs conceded that the AUFTA claims were not timely brought. 

On November 19, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a pleading (1) acknowledging that the AUFTA claims were timed barred and (2) requesting a trial as to the garnishment contest.  On December 1, 2010, on the eve of a hearing on the partial summary judgment motion, the Foundation requested a summary judgment in the garnishment contest.  After conducting a hearing, in which the plaintiffs objected to hearing any summary judgment motion in the garnishment contest, the trial court granted the Foundation a summary judgment in both matters. 

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs were deprived the required 10-day notice and had not waived the right to such notice.  The Supreme Court declared that the plaintiffs were prejudiced because they were deprived the ability to file a response within two days of the hearing.  The Supreme Court rejected the Foundation’s argument that there was no prejudice because, between the hearing and the entry of an order, the plaintiffs could have filed an opposition. The Supreme Court noted that the procedural rules do not provide for the filing of an opposition after a hearing.

Alabama Supreme Court Ruling on Supersedeas Bonds

In Ex parte Mohabbat, No. 1110503, a monetary judgment of $630,000 was entered for the Singhs and against the Mohabbats.  After the Mohabbats’ new-trial motion was denied by operation of law, the Mohabbats appealed.  In the trial court, the Mohabbats filed a motion to allow them to post a supersedeas bond of $100,000, as opposed to $787,500, the amount required by Ala. R. App. P. 8(a)(1), alleging that they did not have the resources to execute a $787,500 bond. The trial court granted the motion. 

In the Alabama Supreme Court, the Singhs filed a mandamus petition.  The Alabama Supreme Court granted the mandamus writ, holding that any motion seeking relief from the requirements of Rule 8(a)(1) must be first filed with the appellate court and that, on its own, a trial court lacks the authority to reduce the amount of the supersedeas bond. 

Thus, an appellant must move the Supreme Court to allow a reduced bond in order to stay execution on the judgment.  The Supreme Court may instruct the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine what the amount of the bond sought be but the initial request must be made to the Supreme Court.